Once Upon a Time...When a Revolution Evolved to a Civil War in Syria by Myers, Crystal M
The Review: A Journal of Undergraduate Student Research 
Volume 20 Article 2 
2019 
Once Upon a Time...When a Revolution Evolved to a Civil War in 
Syria 
Crystal M. Myers 
St. John Fisher College, cm02878@sjfc.edu 
Follow this and additional works at: https://fisherpub.sjfc.edu/ur 
 Part of the Ethnic Studies Commons, Holocaust and Genocide Studies Commons, Islamic Studies 
Commons, Islamic World and Near East History Commons, Near and Middle Eastern Studies Commons, 
and the Sociology of Religion Commons 
How has open access to Fisher Digital Publications 
benefited you? 
Recommended Citation 
Myers, Crystal M.. "Once Upon a Time...When a Revolution Evolved to a Civil War in Syria." The Review: A 
Journal of Undergraduate Student Research 20 (2019): -. Web. [date of access]. 
<https://fisherpub.sjfc.edu/ur/vol20/iss1/2>. 
This document is posted at https://fisherpub.sjfc.edu/ur/vol20/iss1/2 and is brought to you for free and open 
access by Fisher Digital Publications at St. John Fisher College. For more information, please contact 
fisherpub@sjfc.edu. 
Once Upon a Time...When a Revolution Evolved to a Civil War in Syria 
Abstract 
This paper gives an overview of how the conflict in Syria has evolved from a revolution into a sectarian 
civil war. Power is maintained by the ruling Assad family through promotion of the Alawite minority within 
the government and military. Methods of persecution on the Sunni majority by the Assad government are 
discussed as well as a policy of strategic expulsion of the Sunni enclave to Idlib, a city on the outskirts of 
Syria (bordering Turkey). 
Keywords 
Syria, Sunni, Alawite, Assad, Revolution, Civil War, sectarian 
This article is available in The Review: A Journal of Undergraduate Student Research: https://fisherpub.sjfc.edu/ur/
vol20/iss1/2 
 Once Upon a Time...When a Revolution Evolved into Civil War 
Crystal Myers 
ABSTRACT 
This paper gives an overview of how the conflict in Syria has evolved from a revolution into a 
sectarian civil war. Power is maintained by the ruling Assad family through promotion of the 
Alawite minority within the government and military. Methods of persecution of the Sunni 
majority by the Assad government are discussed as well as a policy of strategic expulsion of the 
Sunni enclave to Idlib, a city on the outskirts of Syria (bordering Turkey).  
 
In Syria there is a story that has been told 
and retold, transforming into a prominent 
legend. It is the “once upon a time” of 
young boys who wanted freedom and dared 
to challenge Bashar al-Assad, their despotic 
president. This happened during a time 
period that would become known as the 
Arab Spring, a time when revolutions were 
bountiful, and dreams felt as if they could 
come true.  
The first revolution of the Arab Spring 
started in Tunisia and resulted in the ejection 
of President Zine El Abidine Ben Ali. This 
initial successful revolution was observed in 
other Middle Eastern countries over social 
media outlets such as YouTube and 
Facebook. Tunisia’s triumph gave hope to 
others in the Middle East, who were living 
in comparable autocratic governments and 
desired similar results. People next took to 
the streets in Egypt forcing President Hosni 
Mubarak out of office. Libya’s leader 
Muammar Gaddafi was captured and killed. 
Similarly, in Yemen, President Ali Abdullah 
Saleh voluntarily left office. These 
revolutionary displays were seen as 
successes in that they resulted in leadership 
changes.   
For Syria, it all started in Daraa, when a 
group of boys spray painted the now 
familiar revolutionary slogan: “The people 
want the fall of the regime,” on the side of 
their school building. In some accounts there 
was an additional line, “it’s your turn 
doctor,” a direct jab at President Assad, who 
is an ophthalmologist. The boys were 
apprehended and jailed, with protests 
beginning initially by their friends and 
family, demanding their release. Syrian 
Security forces are known to utilize torture 
in interrogations and so there was well- 
founded fear of the boy’s safety within 
police custody. When they were finally 
released evidence of brutality spurred 
demands for reform. During these 
demonstrations the reaction of the 
government was severe, using militant force 
on its protesting civilians. Consequently, 
many Syrians were arrested, injured or 
killed. The initial call for reform evolved to 
a demand for President Bashar al-Assad to 
step down.  
This is just a brief synopsis of how the 
Syrian revolution initially started. This paper 
itself will seek to explain how a revolution 
that started with humanitarian and 
democratic auspices eventually evolved into 
a sectarian civil war. In order to fully 
understand the ongoing conflict that is 
currently active, we need to first look at the 
demographics of Syria itself. Ted Galen 
Carpenter appropriately described this as, “a 
fragile ethno-religious tapestry that could 
easily unravel” (2013, p. 1). The various 
threads of Syria’s tapestry are: Sunni a little 
less than sixty percent, Christians around 
thirteen percent, Alawites (a Shiite sect) 
about thirteen percent, Druze six percent and 
Sunni ethnic minorities such as Kurds and 
Armenians making up the rest (Carpenter, 
2013).  
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The government power dynamic within 
Syria is like that of a monarchy, with the 
same family ruling the country over the past 
four decades. Most of the al-Assad family 
hold prominent positions within the Syrian 
governments. The Assad's fall into the 
religious category Alawite, a sect of Shiite 
Islam. Although a minority within the 
overall country demographic, this group 
holds majority power within the government 
and Syrian military, wielding the significant 
influence that comes with eighty percent 
holding high positions as military officers, 
and one hundred and forty thousand career 
soldiers, all hailing the religious identity of 
Alawite (Carpenter, 2013).  
When it comes to government provision of 
goods and services the Assad family utilizes 
asabiya as a distribution factor. Asabiya 
(Arabic: ّﺔﯿﺒﺼﻋ) refers to the tribe/clan or in 
this case the Alawite community. This can 
be exemplified by the marked government 
investment in the northwestern governorate 
of Latakia, which has a seventy-five percent 
Alawite population (De Juan & Bank, 2015). 
This same mentality applies to the 
distribution of electricity, a resource that 
falls under jurisdiction of the government. 
The Ministry of Electricity decides what 
areas of Syria will or won’t receive 
electricity, how much and for how long. 
Syria’s grid is well known for having power 
shortages with regularly scheduled 
blackouts. However, these blackouts are not 
distributed equally. As a result of this 
dynamic the Ministry of Electricity has been 
identified on the EU sanctions list for using 
power as a means of repression (De Juan & 
Bank, 2015).  
The same could be said for the distribution 
of land. Salwa Ismail conducted research on 
urban space within Syria, particularly within 
the Damascus area and outlying suburbs. He 
discovered an intentionality by the regime to 
fracture the societal identity of Syrians along 
sectarian lines (2013). Neighborhoods were 
established demographically with Alawi 
quarters placed in various locations as 
military extensions, working for and under 
the regime. A case study of this situation 
looks at the Barzeh quarter and its neighbor 
Ish al-Warwar. These two groups have lived 
in cooperation and have even been referred 
to as Barzawi, a conglomerate of the two 
names (Salwa 2013). Conflict between the 
two emerged when the Ish al-Warwar Alawi 
residents began to suppress revolutionary 
demonstrations against the Assad 
government being conducted by the Barzeh 
Sunni residents. The reason behind this was 
that Ish al-Warwar residents had been told 
the Sunni Barzawis were planning to attack 
them and take their land (Salwa 2013). 
It is believed that throughout the conflict 
this strategy has been used by the regime to 
create alienation between the various sects. 
An interview with Salway Ismail, a Barzeh 
resident confirmed this: “the ‘Ish people are 
oppressed like us, and they are treated as 
slaves, but they defend the regime because 
they are made to fear their 'extremist' Sunni 
neighbors” (Salwa 2013).  
Salwa Ismail (2013) concludes, 
Relations with the regime and the 
demographic composition of quarters are 
the main variables at play in the 
differentiated responses to the Uprising 
observed in Damascus and elsewhere. In 
this complex urban configuration are 
found conflicts over title to land and 
position in relation to government, 
conflicts inflected with sectarian 
meanings. These divisions are well 
illustrated by the case of the Barzeh 
quarter on the northern edge of Damascus 
and its relationship with the neighboring 
community of ‘Ish al-Warwar (p. 883). 
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Another provision of public service that has 
become a strategic method of the Assad 
government is the supplying of food or lack 
thereof, to specific targeted areas. Jose Ciro 
Martinez and Brent Eng summarize this 
strategy. “The provision of bread to regime-
controlled areas has gone hand in hand with 
target efforts to deprive rebel groups of the 
essential foodstuff.” It is common 
knowledge that many of the rebels are 
Sunni. The main method utilized to achieve 
this end is the bombing of bakeries. Over a 
three-week period in August 2012, Human 
Rights Watch (HRW) reported at least ten 
aerial attacks by the government on bakeries 
in Aleppo (Martinez & Eng, 2017).  
A more blunt way to look at this strategy is 
as a “starve or surrender” ultimatum. 
Amnesty International has issued a report 
condemning the Assad regime’s methods of: 
“systematically preventing crucial food and 
medicine supplies from entering civilian 
areas while mounting bombing campaigns, 
amount to war crimes,” violating 
international law (Shaheen, 2017). The 
aforementioned report found that the 
government had restricted UN and other 
humanitarian aid from entering rebel areas, 
while at the same time carrying out 
airstrikes on hospitals, markets, mosques 
and schools, rendering vital public services 
unviable (Shaheen, 2017).     
Regional outside players only exacerbate the 
already tense sectarian lines within Syria. 
Assad has gained support of traditional 
Shiite-led governments, sometimes referred 
to as the “shiite axis” in the Middle East: 
Iraq (Prime Minister Nouri al-Maliki), Iran 
(Supreme leader Ali Khamenei/President 
Hassan Rouhani), and the Hezbollah, a 
Shiite militia from Lebanon (Fuller 2007). 
On the opposing Sunni side there are the 
Gulf States, particularly Saudi Arabia (King 
Salman bin Abdulaziz al-Saud) and to some 
extent Egypt (President Abdel Fattah el-Sisi) 
and Jordan (King Abdullah II). While 
Turkey (President Recep Tayyip Erdogan) 
also tends to side in this arena, Turkey has at 
other times, has maintained neutrality 
between the two divisions (Fuller 2007).  
International actors also play a role in this 
conflict, with Russia (President Vladimir 
Putin) siding with Assad, due to “long 
standing economic and strategic ties” that 
stem from the Cold War era (Carpenter, 
2013, p. 9). It also can’t be overlooked that 
Russia’s only military installation in the 
Mediterranean region exists in the Syrian 
port of Tartous (Carpenter, 2013). China 
(President Xi Jinping) sides with Assad for 
economic reasons. In 2011 Syrian exports to 
China totaled over 2.4 billion, and China has 
a vested interest in Syria’s oil industry 
(Carpenter, 2013). 
Siding with the opposition or merely against 
Assad is the United States and its other 
western allies. The US has taken a stance to 
uphold the “responsibility to protect 
doctrine” which states,  
When a regime brutalizes its population 
in a systematic way the international 
community not only has a right but also 
an obligation to intervene to protect 
vulnerable civilians and if necessary, 
depose an offending regime (Carpenter, 
2013, p. 10). 
This becomes an ideological issue when the 
other two international actors (Russia and 
China) are adhering to the Westphalian 
system, an opposite doctrine that focuses on 
prohibiting any external meddling in a 
country’s internal affairs (Carpenter, 2013).  
The international divide is especially 
exemplified by interactions occurring at the 
global level in United Nations Security 
Council (UNSC) debates. The Syrian 
conflict tends to be framed in terms of 
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“human rights violations and a call for 
outside intervention,” by the three Western 
permanent members. However, for Russia 
and China it is framed as “a complex 
struggle amenable to noninterventionist 
solutions” (Medzihorsky, Popovic & Jenne, 
2017). This ideological divide in UN policy 
becomes the focus of international rhetoric 
overshadowing the actual sectarian divide 
that is occurring on the ground. 
This sectarian divide has become so 
ingrained in a war that has now lasted seven 
years that even resolutions propose a 
tripartite arrangement in which Syria is 
effectively split between ethnic groups. 
Azeem Ibrahim proposes that Assad retain 
the Damascus-Aleppo corridor, that the 
Kurds get their own northeast region and 
that the remaining go to the opposition 
(2017). This would effectively make divided 
Shiite, Kurdish and Sunni enclaves. 
While Syria has not formally been divided 
the country has in some ways already 
evolved into this layout. The Syrian 
government has brokered “reconciliation” 
deals, which usually occur after an 
opposition area has been besieged to the 
point of complacency with the humanitarian 
issue becoming the extreme of a choice 
between the deal or death. Through 
“reconciliation” the regime along with its 
allies offer the opposition, their families and 
civilians “safe passage to rebel-controlled 
Idlib or Jarabulus, in return for ceding the 
besieged area to government forces” (Spyer, 
2017). 
This has become such common practice 
within Syria that there is a Reconciliation 
Affairs Minister, Ali Haidar, who claims 
over one hundred towns/villages have 
brokered such deals with the regime, 
accounting for the displacement of over 
three million Syrians internally to 
Idlib/Jarabulus (Spyer, 2017). In fact, a 
reconciliation deal was just reached in Beit 
Sahem-Babila-Yilda (on May 2, 2018) for 
fifty buses and six ambulances to remove 
seventeen thousand people. The report by 
Syrian media is not a citable nor a reliable 
source, however the wording explicitly 
confirms the research in this paper as it 
directly states, “the people of the towns are 
to open a new page with the Syrian regime 
and coexistence with the Shiite militias in 
the area.”  
As the Syrian regime continues to work with 
its allies to regain control of key areas and to 
remove the residents, it has become clear 
that the demographic is changing. On April 
2nd, 2018, law number ten issued by the 
Syrian regime states, 
This law authorizes the formation of new 
local administrative units (governorates, 
cities, and towns) tasked with registering 
property ownership within their area of 
jurisdiction. Private property owners are 
then given thirty days to register and 
provide proof of ownership. Failure to do 
so will result in the property’s 
confiscation by the state without 
compensation. (Al-Shami, 2018). 
This law would likely target those 
opposition communities in which civilians 
were displaced in “reconciliation deals,” 
effectively making their displacement 
permanent.  
The statement made by Jonathan Spyer that 
“Syria has ceased to exist” argues that the 
country has reached a stalemate in which 
neither the Syrian regime nor the opposition 
rebels can likely succeed in victory. Instead 
there has been a shift towards “arrangements 
acknowledging the fragmentation of the 
country” (2017). These fragments are along 
the ethno-religious divides with which this 
paper began.  
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The future of the ongoing Syrian conflict is 
unclear and there are many actors all with 
their own agendas manipulating the pieces. 
What is clear is that the political and 
religious divide, which has yielded a 
struggle for power, has caused a high 
number of casualties. These casualties can 
be measured by the number of Syrians 
displaced from their homes within Syria, as 
well as the number of Syrians who have fled 
to refugee camps or other countries to seek 
asylum. Additionally, there has been a high 
number of casualties in life from both sides 
with regime fighters and rebels alike being 
killed. Even more disheartening is the large 
number of civilian deaths, people who have 
become caught in the crossfires of the 
struggle for power. 
It is also notable to mention the sheer 
amount of infrastructure and property 
damage that has occurred. No matter what 
the result is of this conflict, there will be a 
lot that needs to be rebuilt. This rebuilding 
process will inevitably involve more than 
just structural repairs but also the 
reimagining of what the identity of Syria as 
a country will be moving forward. 
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